Abstract Once described as hermaphrodites and later as intersex people, individuals born with intersex variations are routinely subject to so-called Bnormalizingm edical interventions, often in childhood. Opposition to such practices has been met by attempts to discredit critics and reasserted clinical authority over the bodies of women and men with Bdisorders of sex development.^However, claims of clinical consensus have been selectively constructed and applied and lack evidence. Limited transparency and lack of access to justice have helped to perpetuate forced interventions. At the same time, associated with the diffusion of distinct concepts of sex and gender, intersex has been constructed as a third legal sex classification, accompanied by pious hopes and unwarranted expectations of consequences.
Introduction
In 2015, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights named Australia and Malta as countries that have made demonstrable progress in recognizing the human rights of intersex people. Australia had held the first parliamentary inquiry on involuntary or coerced medical interventions, implemented a federal third gender classification (Attorney General's Department 2013), and laid claim to Bsome of the most advanced laws in the world, including on intersex status^(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017, ¶15 ). Yet the report of the parliamentary inquiry has not been implemented and forced early medical interventions continue with the imprimatur of the Family Court of Australia. Malta had enacted legal protections for children's bodily integrity (Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 2015 [Malta] ).
The coexistence in Australia of both legal inclusion and surgical Bnormalization^indicates a disjunction between a rhetoric of inclusion and the reality of human rights violations and, specifically, a lack of connection between policies and practices designed to protect people with non-normative identities and policies and practices affecting people born with non-normative bodies. This paper reviews these developments, citing Australian and international sources. It summarizes a chapter to be published in The Legal Status of Intersex Persons by Intersentia in 2018 (Scherpe, Dutta, and Helms 2018) .
Background
Since 2006, a medical model has constructed Bcongenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomical sex is atypical^as Bdisorders of sex development^ (Hughes et al. 2006, 554) . This medical model regards intersex variations as physical Bmalformations^that can be Bfixed^to ensure the healthy physical and psychological development of intersex persons as either female or male; to ameliorate stigma and mitigate parental and societal antipathy.
In contrast, a Bthird sex^model constructs intersex people as people who should be marked as having a non-standard sex. This is succinctly described by Noël Wise, a judge in the California Superior Court, in Time magazine in 2017:
Many individuals are born with sex chromosome, endocrine or hormonal irregularities, and their birth certificates are inaccurate because in the United States birth records are not designed to allow doctors to designate an ambiguous sex. (Wise 2017, ¶3) Both medical and third sex models describe the same population, but both are to some extent ahistorical, reflecting new technologies and social constructions.
In the West, intersex people, Bhermaphrodites,^have been regarded in early canon (church) and common law as either male or female, depending on predominant characteristics (Greenberg 1999) . For example, Edward Coke, in his 16th century Institutes of the Laws of England described heirs as male, female, or hermaphrodites, where a hermaphrodite can be heir either as male or female, Baccording to that kind of the sexe which doth prevaile^ (Greenberg 1999, 277) .
In following centuries, the meaning of the term hermaphrodite narrowed to take on a more precise biological meaning, and doctors sought to identify humans with such characteristics and otherwise determine the Btrue sex^of their patients (Reis 2012 ). Reis describes how clinicians were preoccupied with ideas of sexual deviance and dishonesty. A nascent medical model was juxtaposed against an abject otherness:
Physicians in the 1880s and 1890s wanted their patients to understand their hermaphroditic conditions as deformities and not as a physical license to commit sexual immorality. (Reis 2012, 68) An example was provided by J.W. Long, in 1896: I believe that we owe it to these poor unfortunates to impress upon them, as well as upon others, that they are not part man and part woman … The peculiarities which make them appear mixed, are only deformities like hair-lip or club-foot. (Long 1896, 244) While diagnostic terms have changed, intersex advocates hear the same comparisons made by clinicians today.
Medical Model
Early surgeries to modify sex characteristics were institutionalized in the mid-twentieth century, in part due to the work of John Money. These interventions, based on ideas that infants' gender identities were malleable (Diamond and Sigmundson 1997) , became so pervasive that, by 1969, Dewhurst and Gordon reported that the lives of those not subjected to surgery had to be imagined. They continue to be practiced wherever Western medicine is accessible.
To ensure normative psychological development, medical histories were often withheld from patients with a consequential loss to follow-up and poor-quality evidence supporting medical interventions (Lee et al. 2016) . Key decisions about gender assignment were based on technical aspects of surgery and heteronormative function, including the idea that Byou can make a hole but you can't build a pole^ (Hendricks 1993, 10 (Davis 2011) . Pressure for the meeting may also have arisen from public reports on Alex MacFarlane, an Australian who may have been the first to receive a non-binary passport and birth certificate (MeyerBahlburg et al. 2004) .
The invite-only meeting was notable for the omission of clinicians who opposed early interventions and the presence of two community group representatives amongst fifty clinicians. One of them, Barbara Thomas, has remarked that they were marginalized, but their presence has been employed to validate a new nomenclature of Bdisorders of sex development^agreed at the meeting (for example, O'Connor 2016, 533); this was proposed to distinguish a biological state from Bidentity^or Bthe person as a whole^ (Thomas 2006, 2) . The meeting also promoted referrals to multidisciplinary teams, in order to provide families with specialized, experienced healthcare.
The resulting Bconsensus^statement outlined the available evidence on cancer risks, albeit frequently based on limited studies and small samples, recommending actions including gonadectomies or monitoring. Regarding cosmetic Bnormalizing^prac-tices, the statement is notable for use of terms like Bfeltâ nd Bbelief^; necessary given a lack of systemic evidence to underpin clinical practice . Rationales for intervention belie aspirations of distinguishing biological states from issues of identity; they include Bminimizing family concern and distress, and mitigating the risks of stigmatization and genderidentity confusion of atypical genital appearance ( Houk et al. 2006, 755) .
Within the Australian context, the global statement was given effect by a 2010 set of principles. These principles appear designed to direct children's identity formation and promote family integration. They outline Bpsychosocial risks^minimized through medical interventions including Breduced opportunities for marriage( until recently a heterosexual institution) and Bstigma associated with having genitalia which do not match the gender in which the [child] lives^ (Gillam, Hewitt, and Warne 2010, 415) .
By 2013, these principles had been widely disseminated across Australia and incorporated into derivative Victorian principles and pressure brought to bear on policymakers by intersex and disability advocates led to a Senate inquiry on involuntary or coerced sterilization. A public submission to that inquiry by Hewitt, Warne, and others for the Australasian Paediatric Endocrine Group claimed that Bconsensus statements … describe recommended indications for genital and gonadal surgery^ (APEG et al. 2013, 2) . Despite Bparticular concern^regarding post-surgical Bsexual function and sensation,^the Group justifies interventions for reasons of appearance including:
… for functional reasons [sic] such as to allow a male individual to urinate while standing, and for psychosocial reasons such as to allow the child to develop without the psychosocial stigma or distress which is associated with having genitalia incongruous with the sex of rearing. (APEG et al. 2013, 4) The resulting Senate report found that Bsurgery is intended to deconstruct an intersex physiology and, in turn, construct an identity that conforms with stereotypical male and female gender categories ( Senate 2013, 69) . It also reported that Bthere is no medical consensus around the conduct of normalising surgery^ (Senate 2013, 68) .
A recent 2016 global update to the earlier clinical Bconsensus^concurs, finding that there is still no Bconsensual attitude^towards clinical practices, including their Bindications, timing, procedure and evaluation of outcome,^nor evidence on Brisk of stigmatization ( Lee et al. 2016, 176) . Writers for the Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe report that: … Bquality of life^studies on patients into adulthood are lacking and are Bpoorly researched^, (2) the overall impact on the sexual function on children surgically altered is Bimpaired^and (3) the claim that gender development requires surgery is a Bbelief^unsubstantiated by data. (Zillén, Garland, and Slokenberga 2017, 43) Available clinical data lacks adequate sample sizes, independence, and often lacks relevant control groups. It is often framed around clinical preoccupations with, for example, genital appearance, heterosexuality, and gender conformity (Houben et al. 2014, 482) . Studies have asked leading questions (Baratz and Feder 2015) , while patient views have been cherry-picked. In some reports, patient views may simply reflect a lack of informed consent and unsubstantiated claims. For example, a Chinese study cited by Meyer-Bahlburg (2015) reported that clinicians and their patients favoured early surgeries (Zhang et al. 2013) . At the same time, many individuals remain unaware of their medical history and are lost to follow-up, with consequences for their health and sexuality (Kirkland 2017; Lee et al. 2016; Blackwood 2018) .
However, policymakers such as a former Australian Capital Territory Chief and Health Minister have unwisely appeared satisfied that Bconsensus^implies agreement about clinical practices, with national and international consistency (Gallagher 2014a) .
Clinical practitioners have Bnot responded well^to criticism (Zillén et al. 2017, 43) . In 1993, Edgerton stated that no individuals Bcomplained of a loss of sensation, even when the entire clitoris had been removed^ (Edgerton 1993, 956) . Just three years later, complainants were dismissed in The New York Times as Bzealots^and Bthe unhappy ones^ (Angier 1996, ¶12-13) . Similar claims were made by Australian clinicians to the Senate in 2013 (APEG et al. 2013, 4) , while attempts have also been made to marginalize intersex advocacy groups as holding isolated, unsupported beliefs (for example, Department of Health and Human Services, Victoria 2016).
Claims of changed or improved medical practices have been made since at least 1987 (Lobe et al. 1987) , often expressing a narrative of continuous technical improvement. The effect is to dismiss dissenting testimonial, advocacy, and clinical reports as describing obsolete medical practices. Such claims of change fail to address the more fundamental issue of necessity, but they also lack evidence.
Where statistical evidence exists, it does not support claims of change to clinical practices, including U.K. data (Creighton et al. 2014) , German data (Klöppel 2016) , and mixed reports from the United States (Human Rights Watch 2017).
Australian data lack transparency. Reports of surgery numbers in specific Victorian (Bock 2013) Re: Carla is notable for its extensive disclosure of gender stereotypes as rationales for sterilization, including parental descriptions of female gender identity development and reference to the child's BBarbie bedspread,^Bfairy stations,^BMinnie Mouse underwear,^and long blond braids (15). The child was, however, not in a position to freely exercise choice about such accoutrements. The Court explicitly ordered surgery prior to her capacity to understand the procedure (30), itself implicitly acknowledging a lack of urgency, while noting that Carla might need further surgery to facilitate (heterosexual) intercourse (18).
Carla's sterilization was set in train by an earlier clitorectomy and labioplasty (16), disturbingly described by the judge as having Benhanced the appearance of her female genitalia^(2).
Children assigned female with this intersex traits are known to later change sex assignment at a rate of between 39-64 percent, according to a clinical review (Cohen-Kettenis 2005) . When clitoral and phallus tissues are homologues, it is not possible to unambiguously ascertain the kind of Bcongenital malformation^that has been ascribed to Carla.
In 
Third Sex Model
The Western canon and common law approach to hermaphrodites has broken in the model period. In part, this may reflect the consignment of intersex bodies to the imagination (Dewhurst and Gordon 1969) but it also reflects the imagining and construction of new concepts of gender and of non-binary or third gender. Historical and non-Western anthropological texts have since been reinterpreted, including to demonstrate a perceived superiority in systems that allow for a third gender (Holmes 2004) . These include the memoirs of Herculine Barbin, a nineteenth-century intersex woman interpreted by Foucault as illustrating Ba happy limbo^of non-identity (Foucault 2013, 17-18) , despite a self-understanding as Ban exceptional female ( Holmes 2004, 6) .
Money claimed to first describe gender as identity (Downing, Morland, and Sullivan 2014) . Sullivan describes how he presented Bgender identity^and Bgender role^as ways of encapsulating sometimes discordant aspects of embodiment into a masculine or feminine whole (Downing, Morland, and Sullivan 2014) . This Cartesian separation of bodies and identities enabled Money to understand the identities of intersex people, and it enables feminists and LGBT people to distinguish cultural gender-specific roles and norms from biology.
Gender, and the existence of intersex people, have been utilized to support human rights demands by marginalized populations. However, such claims have often neglected to consider their impact on an intersex population or have displayed pious hopes about such claims. In doing so, they fail to comprehend that whether a society is divided into two or three categories is of less import than how the various groupings are valued (Holmes 2004) .
To illustrate the problem, Kondratenko (2016) has claimed:
… countries, like Germany, Malta, Australia and New Zealand, added the third box corresponded to gender on the birth certificates. It gives parents of intersex infants the right to choose the third option: marking the sex category BX^or Bother^. By doing so, parents and doctors are not forced to put intersex babies through surgeries that would turn them into male or female. Thus, as intersex children grow up, they have the right to realise their identity by themselves. ( ¶8) Indeed, some intersex (and non-intersex) people have non-binary or other non-normative gender identities. A 2015 Australian sociological convenience sample of 272 people born with atypical sex characteristics found that 19 per cent favoured BX^or non-binary classifications, yet 60 per cent use the term intersex to describe themselves (Jones 2017) .
However, an assumed consequential relationship between non-binary classifications and an end to Bnormalizing^medical interventions lacks evidence. Third sex models of intersex assume homogeneity in identity and fail to explain how new classifications interact with medical practices. Indeed, new classifications for infants and children have been opposed by intersex-led organizations in Australia and Europe, for adding to pressure promoting medical interventions in order to avoid perceived uncertainty and public disclosure.
Instead, Kondratenko's analysis (like that of Wise [2017] ) homogenizes and naturalizes intersex bodies as Bothers,^assuming that a natural and singular identity realized by intersex people is necessarily non-binary. The same broad claims are true of policymakers. Writing on a third classification for birth certificates, the former Chief and Health Minister of the Australian Capital Territory made the same assumption, claiming that a new classification would address parental rights and a Brisk that parents will force their child to conform to a particular gender or subject them to gender assignment surgery or other medical procedures to match the child's physical characteristics to the chosen sex ( Gallagher 2014b) . To date, no children have been so classified.
Perhaps due to the framing of such new classifications, the inclusion of Bintersex status^in Australian anti-discrimination law, has typically been imputed as a matter of gender recognition (Yoosuf 2015) , even though this was not intended or sought by either government or community advocates (House of Representatives 2013; OII Australia 2012). This interpretation has been reinforced by poorly-drafted guidelines on recognition of sex and gender that simultaneously include intersex within the definition of a nonbinary category BX^and recognize that intersex people may identify as female, male, or neither (Attorney General's Department 2013). An NGO consortium requested that BX^be redefined as non-binary in 2015 (Sex and Gender Advisory Group 2015) , and recent changes to Australian Standards appear to move towards this position.
Imputations of intersex as a third sex have been deployed to support legal recognition of non-binary persons (DLA Piper Australia 2014). Failing to recognize the distinctiveness and heterogeneity of intersex populations and often medicalizing intersex bodies in the process (Colangelo 2017) , such actions paradoxically reinforce ideas that gendered identities need to match sexed bodies in order to be valid.
Misconceptions around intersex as a third sex help to sustain medical authority over Bdisorderedf emale or male children by maintaining a boundary between medical jurisdiction over bodies and socio-political influences over classifications of identities. By failing to reflect the heterogeneity of intersex identities and bodies, a coming to knowledge of children and adults with intersex variations, and their families, is interrupted. Instead of facilitating self-determination, associating intersex with any single legal sex classification constrains that ability.
New risks have been created, including concepts of deception that were reported when hermaphrodites were first medicalized. In the 1979 Family Court case In the Marriage of C and D (falsely called C) ([1979] FLC 90-636) , the marriage of an intersex man, assigned and raised male and who had undergone medical interventions to reinforce his male characteristics, was annulled on the basis that he was not a man and that his wife was unable to consent as she Bwas mistaken as to the identity of the husband^(iv). A third identity may have been unavailable at the time, but similar rhetoric surrounding Bdeviation in sex characteristics^is evident in sport (Jordan-Young, Sonksen, and Karkazis 2014, 1) and in legal cases regarding consent in relationships with transgender people (Gross 2015) .
These issues are made more complex not only by a lack of Australian resourcing for affirmative peer and family support and systemic advocacy, substituted by representation by BLGBTI^organizations offering services for queer adult sexual health, HIV prevention, and gender affirmation. This complexity is deepened by individuals promoting a contested, medicalized conception of Btranssexualism^as both Bintersexual^and a Bdisorder of sexual development,^in order to relieve stigma arising from a psychological diagnosis and reflecting a perceived ease of access to medical intervention by which intersex children are Bfixed^(National Foundation for Australian Women 2016).
A Third Way
Clinical practices are known to result in loss of sexual function and sensation, a need for repeat surgeries, incorrect legal sex assignment, infertility and lifelong need for hormone replacement, genital examinations, loss of bodily integrity, and trauma (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights et al. 2016) . The naturalization of a third sex promotes pious hopes, while the existence of intersex people is instrumentalized for the benefit of other, overlapping, populations. These reinforce associations between being intersex and being
LGBT, yet these forms of biological essentialism also underpin forced medical interventions and create risks associated with claims of deception.
These circumstances create a complex, challenging environment. In response, the intersex rights movement has steadily turned towards the human rights system and in particular principles recognizing rights to bodily integrity and self-determination. Informed by testimonies and international and local community statements (Third International Intersex Forum 2013; AISSGA et al. 2017 
Conclusions
Medicine constructs intersex bodies as either female or male, while law and society construct intersex as neither female nor male. This conflict arises from fundamentally different ideas about the meaning of intersex variations and how to name them, even while there is agreement about their fundamental characteristics. In response to this complex situation, an emerging advocacy and human rights consensus focuses on simple core demands, for self-determination and the right to bodily integrity, demanding an end to forced and coercive medical interventions, social prejudice, and stigma.
Actions to recognize the rights of intersex people in law should address the core human rights issues and refrain from exacerbating contradictory demands. Examples of good practice include implementation of protections from violence, harmful practices, and discrimination on grounds of sex characteristics and of universally available non-binary sex markers.
